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CONSTITUTIONAL LAW-CRIMINAL LAW-EVIDENCEAdmissibility of a Motorist's Refusal to Take a Breath-Alcohol Test:
McKay v. Davis

I. INTRODUCTION

Drunken drivers have received wide-spread attention in the past few
years.' The realization that New Mexico is acutely plagued by intoxicated
motorists2 has produced initiatives from New Mexico's executive, 3 legislative,' and judicial branches ' to curb drunken driving. McKay v. Davis6
embodies the latest effort by New Mexico courts to "get tough" with
drunken drivers.
In McKay v. Davis,7 the New Mexico Supreme Court facilitated the
prosecution of those accused of drunken driving! The court held that a
motorist's refusal to submit to a breath-alcohol test9 is admissible evidence
1. See, e.g., The War Against Drunk Drivers, Newsweek, Sept. 13, 1982, at 34; Is the Pary
Finally Over?, Time, Apr. 26, 1982, at 58; The New York Times, Dec. 31, 1982, at B-4, col. 3;
The Albuquerque Journal, Aug. 12, 1982, at B-2, col. 5.
2. Sixteen percent (7,649) of the 47,407 traffic accidents in New Mexico during 1980 involved
alcohol. Alcohol was involved in 66.9% of all fatal accidents in that year and is undoubtedly part
of the reason that New Mexico's death rate from traffic accidents is 57% higher than the national
average. Traffic Safety Bureau, New Mexico Department of Transportation, New Mexico Traffic
Accident Data 1980 (1981) (available at the University of New Mexico Law Library).
3. See Recommendations of the Governor's Task Force on Driving While Intoxicated and Alcohol
Abuse (December, 1982) (available from the State of New Mexico, Health and Environment Department).
4. See 1982 N.M. Laws ch. 102 (providing for mandatory jail sentences for offenders convicted
of drunk driving within five years of a prior drunk driving conviction, limitations on plea bargaining,
and mandatory charging of a motorist determined to have a blood-alcohol level of 0.15% or higher)
(codified as amended in N.M. Stat. Ann. §§66-8-102, -102.1 (Cum. Supp. 1983) and N.M. Stat.
Ann. § 66-8-110 (Cum. Supp. 1982)); 1983 N.M. Laws ch. 76 (increasing the penalty for vehicular
homicide committed while driving drunk, extending the maximum probationary period for drunk
driving convictions, and providing for mandatory charging of a motorist determined to have a bloodalcohol level of 0. 10% or higher) (codified in N.M. Stat. Ann. §§ 66-8-101, -102, -110 (Cum. Supp.
1983)).
5. See, e.g., Lopez v. Maez, 98 N.M. 625, 651 P.2d 1269 (1982) (a tavernkeeper who supplies
an obviously intoxicated patron with liquor may be liable for injuries inflicted by the patron while
the patron is driving under the influence of the alcohol). The court in Lopez placed the burden of
preventing drunk driving on those who can best prevent a person from drinking and driving.
6. 99 N.M. 29, 653 P.2d 860 (1982).
7. Id.
8. Id. at 30, 653 P.2d at 861.
9. A breath-alcohol test is a type of blood-alcohol test which indirectly tests the percentage of
alcohol, by weight, in a person's blood. A device traps a specific volume of air expelled from the
motorist's lower lungs and gauges the percentage of alcohol in the sample. A number of different
machines are manufactured for this purpose, such as the Breathalyzer 1000, Intoxilizer 4011 A and
4011AS, Auto-Intoximeter, Alco Analyzer 1000, and SM-7. See generally R. Erwin, Defense of
Drunk Driving Cases, chs. 14-24A (3rd ed. 1982).
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at trial.'" While the result serves the legitimate public policy of aiding
the conviction of drunken drivers, the opinion is overly broad and leaves
doubt as to whether the rights of the accused are being adequately safeguarded.
The New Mexico Supreme Court resolved the defendant's fifth amendment claim by finding that a refusal to take a breath-alcohol test is nontestimonial as well as not compelled." Each of these two determinations
leads to the conclusion that a refusal is not protected by the fifth amendment. In contrast, the recent United States Supreme Court decision of
South Dakota v. Neville 2 reaches the same result, but does so on much
narrower grounds. This Note examines the New Mexico Supreme Court's
reasoning in McKay v. Davis and compares it with the rationale of South
Dakota v. Neville.
II. STATEMENT OF THE CASE
On February 7, 1981, Frank McKay was arrested and charged with
driving while under the influence of intoxicating liquor or drugs (DWI). 3
When the arresting officer requested that McKay take a breath-alcohol
test, McKay refused. " The case was assigned to Judge Thomas B. Davis
of the Bernalillo County Metropolitan Court."' A pretrial conference was
held and McKay informed the court that he would move to exclude any
reference to his refusal to take the breath-alcohol test. 16 McKay contended
that this evidence would violate his privilege under the Fifth Amendment
of the United States Constitution 17to remain silent after being arrested. 8
The trial court stated that it would permit the introduction of evidence
concerning McKay's refusal.' 9 McKay petitioned the Bernallilo County
District Court for a writ of prohibition to prevent the prosecutor from
using his refusal against him at trial.2° The district court granted a permanent writ of prohibition barring the metropolitan court from admitting
10. McKay, 99 N.M. at 31, 653 P.2d at 862.
11. Id.
12. 103 S. Ct. 916 (1983).
13. Transcript of Record on Appeal at 39 [hereinafter cited as Record]. The Record is available
at the University of New Mexico and New Mexico Supreme Court Law Libraries. Driving while
under the influence of intoxicating liquor or drugs (DWI) is a violation of N.M. Stat. Ann. § 66-8102 (Cum. Supp. 1983).
14. McKay, 99 N.M. at 29, 653 P.2d at 860.
15. Record at 39.
16. 99 N.M. at 30, 653 P.2d at 861.
17. U.S. Const. amend. V. The fifth amendment states, in pertinent part, that "[n]o person .
shall ... be compelled in any criminal case to be a witness against himself." It was made applicable
to the states through the fourteenth amendment by Malloy v. Hogan, 378 U.S. 1 (1964).
18. Record at 39.
19. 99 N.M. at 30, 653 P.2d at 861.
20. Record at 1.
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2
McKay's refusal into evidence and Judge Davis appealed. ' The New
Mexico Supreme Court reversed the district court's grant of the writ of
prohibition and held that evidence of a defendant's refusal to take a breathalcohol test is admissible at trial. 22

III. DISCUSSION AND ANALYSIS
The New Mexico Supreme Court's determination in McKay v. Davis
that evidence of a motorist's refusal to take a breath-alcohol test is admissible rests on three separate conclusions. First, the court held that the
Implied Consent Act 23 grants a motorist accused of DWI the power to

refuse to take a breath-alcohol test, but that this power does not rise to
the level of a statutory right of refusal.24 Second, the court stated that
the privilege against self-incrimination provided by the fifth amendment
is not violated by admitting evidence of a motorist's refusal to take a
breath-alcohol test because the refusal is neither testimonial nor compelled.25 Third, the court concluded that evidence of a defendant's refusal
to take a breath-alcohol test is relevant to show his consciousness of guilt
and fear of the test results.26 Based on these three conclusions, the court
held that evidence of a refusal to take a breath-alcohol test is admissible
at trial on a DWI charge. 27
A. The Power of Refusal under the Implied Consent Act
New Mexico's Implied Consent Act28 provides that a driver of a motor
vehicle in New Mexico implicitly consents to submit to a breath and/or
blood test to determine the drug or alcoholic content of his blood when
arrested for any offense allegedly committed while driving a motor vehicle
under the influence of drugs or alcohol. 29 The implied consent exists even
if the accused is dead, unconscious, or otherwise incapable of refusing
to submit to the test. 3" The Implied Consent Act recognizes, however,
3
that a motorist may refuse to submit to the test; if a motorist refuses to
21. Id. at 43-44.
22. 99 N.M. at 32, 653 P.2d at 863.
23. N.M. Stat. Ann. §§66-8-105 to -112 (1978 and Cum. Supp. 1983) (McKay was decided
under the laws in effect in 1982, but the statutes are the same in all pertinent parts. Citations
throughout this Note will be to the most recent compilations unless there have been material changes
in the text of the statute).
24. 99 N.M. at 31, 653 P.2d at 862.

25.
26.
27.
28.
29.
30.
31.

Id.
Id. at 32, 653 P.2d at 863.
Id.
N.M. Stat. Ann. §§66-8-105 to -112 (1978 and Cum. Supp. 1983).
Id. § 66-8-107 (Cum. Supp. 1983)
Id. §66-8-108 (1978).
Id. §66-8-111 (Cum. Supp. 1983).
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take the test, no test will be administered. 32 The Implied Consent Act
mandates, however, that refusal will result in the revocation of the motorist's license for one year, unless the motorist pleads guilty or nolo
contendre to the charge of DWI within thirty days. 3 3 The motorist must
be warned in advance that his refusal could result in license revocation.3 4
These statutory provisions contemplate that some motorists will refuse
to submit to breath-alcohol tests. According to Schmerber v. California,35
however, motorists generally have no constitutional right to refuse to
submit to a blood or breath test.36 In that case, Schmerber had been
drinking and was driving an automobile when it struck a tree. While he
was at the hospital obtaining treatment for injuries sustained in the accident, he was arrested for DWI. Schmerber, on advice of counsel, refused
to submit to a blood-alcohol test. Ignoring Schmerber's refusal, a police
officer directed a physician to draw blood from the petitioner; the blood
sample indicated that Schmerber was intoxicated. The trial court admitted
the blood test results into evidence at Schmerber's trial for DWI and
Schmerber was convicted.3 7
On appeal, the United States Supreme Court held that the forced testing
was permissible and the test results were admissible into evidence.38 The
Court found that the testing did not violate the constitutional guarantee
of due process of law,39 the privilege against self-incrimination,' the right
to counsel, 4' or the right to be free from unreasonable searches and
seizures.42 The Court held that the Constitution provides no right of refusal
and does not bar states from compelling motorists accused of DWI to
take blood-alcohol tests.43
The New Mexico Legislature has chosen not to impose forced testing
upon motorists accused of DWI. New Mexico statutes provide that if an
accused refuses to take a breath-alcohol test, the police officer shall not
32. Id. § 66-8-111(A). If a person is arrested for an alcohol-related motor vehicle offense which
results in death or the likelihood of death or which involves a felony, however, a blood or breath
test may be compelled by the police after they obtain a valid search warrant authorizing the test.
Id.
33. Id. §66-8-111(B).
34. Id.
35. 384 U.S. 757 (1966).
36. The state is prevented, however, from obtaining the evidence by means which offend "a
sense of justice." See Rochin v. California, 342 U.S. 165, 173 (1952).
37. 384 U.S. at 758-59.
38. Id. at 759.
39. Id. at 759-60.
40. Id. at 760-65.
41. Id. at 765-66.
42. Id. at 766-72.
43. In Schmerber, the Court concluded that "the Constitution does not forbid the States minor
intrusions into an individual's body under stringently limited conditions.
Id. at 772.
44. N.M. Stat. Ann. §66-8-111(A) (Cum. Supp. 1983).
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administer the test." This provision prevents violent confrontations between drunken motorists and police officers. 45 The Legislature has opted
not to force a refusing motorist to take a breath-alcohol test even though
the United States Supreme Court in Schmerber found forced testing to
be permissible.
The McKay court, in addressing the claimed statutory right not to be
tested for blood-alcohol levels, examined the New Mexico Court of Appeals decision in State v. Wilson.46 Wilson involved facts similar to
Schmerber: the defendant was arrested for an alcohol-related motor vehicle offense and a blood-alcohol test was performed on him after he
refused to consent to its administration.4 7 At the time Wilson was decided,
New Mexico law provided that no blood-alcohol test could ever be ad48
ministered if the defendant refused to submit to the test. The New
Mexico Court of Appeals held that the trial court correctly suppressed
evidence of the blood sample and its analysis, stating: "The exclusion
of the blood test was appropriate. The sample was taken in violation of
a statutory right." 49 The court failed, however, to identify the violated
right.
McKay argued that the "statutory right" referred to in Wilson was the
right to refuse to take a breath-alcohol test.' ° The McKay court, however,
found it "clear" that the statutory right referred to in Wilson was "the
right not to be forcibly tested after manifesting refusal."" In effect, the
Implied Consent Act language, which states that "[i]f a person under
arrest . . . refuses upon request . . . to submit to chemical tests ... ,
none shall be administered . .,"52 does not mean that motorists have a
right to refuse to take the test. Rather, the language indicates that the
state has no right to forcibly gather the evidence against the motorist's
will.
The court in McKay characterized the ability to refuse as a "power"
rather than a "right." 53 The court cautioned, however, that a motorist
45. See South Dakota v. Neville, 103 S. Ct. 916, 921 (1983); see also Hill v. State, 366-So. 2d
318, 323 (Ala. 1979) and authorities cited therein.
46. State v. Wilson, 92 N.M. 54, 582 P.2d 826 (Ct. App. 1978).
47. Id. at 55, 582 P.2d at 827.
48. N.M. Stat. Ann. §64-22-2.11(A) (1953) (now codified as N.M. Stat. Ann. §66-8-111(A)
(Cum. Supp. 1983)). Subsequent to Wilson, the statute was amended and the law now provides that,
in certain circumstances, a blood-alcohol test may be administered after obtaining a search warrant.
See N.M. Stat. Ann. §66-8-111(A) (Cum. Supp. 1983).
49. 92 N.M. at 56, 582 P.2d at 828 (citation omitted).
50. McKay, 99 N.M. at 30, 653 P.2d at 861.
51. Id. at 30, 653 P.2d at 861.
52. N.M. Stat. Ann. § 66-8-111(A) (Cum.Supp. 1983).
53. 99 N.M. at 31, 653 P.2d at 862. The court stated: "What actually exists is the driver's
statutory power to refuse to submit to the physical act of intrusion upon his body. To call such a
power a 'right' to refuse is a misnomer." Id.
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may be penalized for exercising the power to refuse to take a breath test
because a refusal may be used in evidence against an accused.54 If the
ability to refuse were labeled as a statutory right, the admission of evidence of a refusal to submit to a breath-alcohol test would impinge upon
the exercise of that right and would be inadmissible.55 Therefore, as the
court recognized, once the ability to refuse is labeled a "power" rather
than a "right," evidence of a refusal clearly is admissible.56
B. Refusal as Self-Incrimination
The fifth amendment privilege against self-incrimination is derived
from the common law. 57 The common law protection was developed to
prevent the inhumane treatment of an accused and to promote a fair stateindividual balance; the development also was intended to ensure that the
government disturbs individuals only for good cause and proves its case
without the assistance of an accused. 5" The privilege protects individuals
against "testimonial compulsion," 59 but it does not extend to the inspection of an accused's bodily condition.' Although these interpretations
are clear, it is less obvious whether an accused's refusal to submit to an
inspection of his bodily condition, in the present case by means of a
breath-alcohol test, is protected by the privilege against self-incrimination. 6
In Schmerber v. California,62 the United States Supreme Court held
that the introduction of the results of a blood-alcohol test into evidence
54. Id. at 30, 31, 653 P.2d at 861, 862.
55. See Duckworth v. State, 309 P.2d 1103 (Okla. Crim. App. 1957). The Duckworth court
stated:
It ill behooves the courts to say you have a right to refuse to do something, which
may prove either beneficial or detrimental to you, and yet, notwithstanding your
right so to do, we will permit your refusal to be shown and enable the state to
destroy your right and achieve indirectly by innuendo what it was prevented by
law from accomplishing directly.
Id. at 1105. See also Newhouse v. Misterly, 415 F.2d 514, 518 (9th Cir. 1969).
56. The court in McKay stated that, "[bly correctly labeling the statutory power to refuse as a
power rather than a right, the admissability of the refusal evidence is rendered clearly proper." 99
N.M. at 31, 653 P.2d at 862.
57. 8 J. Wigmore, Evidence § 2252 (McNaughton Rev. 1961) [hereinafter cited as Wigmore].
58. Id. § 2251.
59. Id. § 2263.
60. Id. § 2265.
61. Wigmore states: "Unless some attempt is made to secure a commmunication-written, oral
or otherwise-upon which reliance is to be placed as involving his consciousness of the facts and
the operation of his mind in expressing it, the demand made upon him is not a testimonial one."
Id. at § 2265. The McKay court's adoption of the view that a refusal is "conduct indicating a
consciousness of guilt," 99 N.M. at 31, 653 P.2d at 862 (citing Newhouse v. Misterly, 415 F.2d
514, 518 (9th Cir. 1969)), may fit into Wigmore's exception because the state relies on the conduct
to show that the defendant knew he was guilty; the conduct, therefore, may be deemed testimonial.
The state makes no "attempt" to elicit the refusal, however, and, as a result, may avoid Wigmore's
exception.
62. 384 U.S. 757.
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did not violate the petitioner's fifth amendment privilege against selfincrimination. 6 3 The court based this holding on the determination that
"the privilege protects an accused only from being compelled to testify
against himself, or otherwise provide the State with evidence of a testimonial or communicative nature. . . . " According to the Court, bloodalcohol test evidence, although compelled, is neither testimonial nor communicative. The Court declared in footnote 9, however, that testimonial
statements which indirectly result from forcing a motorist to submit to
65
the test may be privileged under the fifth amendment. The Court noted
that evidence of petitioner's refusal to submit to a breath-alcohol test was
similar to such a testimonial by-product.' The Court further stated that
general fifth amendment principles would govern whether a refusal was
admissible into evidence.67 Most jurisdictions examining the issue have
decided that refusal evidence does not violate the fifth amendment and
is admissible;6 8 a few states, however, reach the conclusion that the
evidence is inadmissible.69
63. Id. at 761.
64. Id.
65. Footnote 9 of Schmerber states:
This conclusion would not necessarily govern had the State tried to show that
the accused had incriminated himself when told that he would have to be tested.
Such incriminating evidence may be an unavoidable by-product of the compulsion
to take the test, especially for an individual who fears the extraction or opposes
it on religious grounds. If it wishes to compel persons to submit to such attempts
to discover evidence, the State may have to forego the advantage of any testimonial
products of administering the test-products which would fall within the privilege.
Indeed, there may be circumstances in which the pain, danger, or severity of an
operation would almost inevitably cause a person to prefer confession to undergoing the "search," and nothing we say today should be taken as establishing the
permissability of compulsion in that case. But no such situation is presented in
this case.
Petitioner has raised a similar issue in this case, in connection with a police
request that he submit to a "breathalyzer" test of air expelled from his lungs for
alcohol content. He refused the request, and evidence of his refusal was admitted
in evidence without objection. He argues that the introduction of this evidence
and a comment by the prosecutor in closing argument upon his refusal is ground
for reversal under Griffin v. California. . . . We think general Fifth Amendment
principles, rather than the particular holding of Griffin, would be applicable in
these circumstances. ...
Id. at 765-66 n.9 (citations omitted) (emphasis in original).
The defendant failed to object at trial to the admission of his refusal into evidence. The Supreme
Court, therefore, refused to rule on the admissibility of a motorist's refusal to take a blood-alcohol
test. Id. at 766 n.9.
66. Id. at 765 n.9.
67. Id. at 766 n.9. Various courts have pondered the import of footnote 9. The Ninth Circuit felt
that "[tihe second portion of footnote 9 muddies up the waters somewhat." Newhouse v. Misterly,
415 F.2d 514, 518 (9th Cir. 1969), cert. denied, 397 U.S. 966 (1970). In Hill v. State, 366 So. 2d
318, 325 (Ala. 1979), the court mused that "it is unclear exactly what sort of testimonial products
the Court had in mind."
68. See Annot. 87 A.L.R.2d 370, 378-83 (1963) and supplementary cases.
69. Id. at 383 and supplementary cases.
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1. The Majority View
The majority view holds that evidence of a motorist's refusal to take
a breath-alcohol test does not violate the privilege against self-incrimination and, therefore, is admissible.7" This conclusion is derived from
either of two different rationales: one rationale holds a refusal is nontestimonial and the other concludes that a refusal is not compelled.7
The Ninth Circuit's opinion in Newhouse v. Misterly72 is representative
of decisions holding that a refusal is non-testimonial. The court affirmed
the denial of a petition for a writ of habeas corpus based on the allegation
that the admission into evidence of the petitioner's refusal to take a bloodalcohol test violated her right to be free from self-incrimination.73 The
court determined that parts of footnote 9 prevent a state from using "an
incriminating statement by the accused which is induced by the requirement that the test be taken."" In addition, the court found that other
parts of footnote 9 prohibit the admission of refusal evidence where there
75
is a constitutional or statutory right to refuse to take the test.
Reading the footnote as a whole, however, the court determined that
a refusal to take a blood-alcohol test is not a testimonial statement. 76 The

court found the refusal to be physical evidence in the nature of "conduct

indicating a consciousness of guilt.", 77 Therefore, the introduction of, and

comment on, evidence of the petitioner's refusal to take the test did not
violate her fifth amendment privilege to be free from self-incrimination.
Additionally, the court found no statutory right to refuse to take the test
and the court held refusal evidence to be admissible. 78
The same conclusion has been reached by finding that a motorist is
not compelled to refuse to take the test.79 In People v. Thomas,"° the New
70. Id. at 378-83 and supplementary cases.

71. Id.
72. 415 F.2d 514 (9th Cir. 1969), cert. denied, 397 U.S. 966 (1970).
73. The petitioner, Betty Jane Newhouse, was arrested for drunk driving and refused to take a
blood-alcohol test; this refusal was admitted into evidence at her trial for DWI, which resulted in a
conviction. Newhouse filed a petition for a writ of habeas corpus in federal court alleging, inter
alia, that the admission of evidence of her refusal to take the test violated her right to be free from
self-incrimination. The district court denied the petition and the Ninth Circuit affirmed. Id.
74. Id. at 518.
75. The court declared that admission under such circumstances would be an improper penalization
for exercising the right to refuse to take the test. Id.

76. Id.
77. Id. But see infra note 128.
78. 415 F.2d at 518. The language of the Newhouse court indicates, however, that if an accused
makes a testimonial statement when confronted with the blood-alcohol test requirement, evidence
of a refusal may be inadmissible. Id. at 518.
79. A good deal of confusion exists as to what is being compelled. Some cases discuss compulsion
in terms of being compelled to refuse to take the test. See, e.g., South Dakota v. Neville, 103 S.
Ct. 916 (1983); People v. Thomas, 46 N.Y.2d 100, 385 N.E.2d 584, 412 N.Y.S.2d 845 (1978).
Other courts frame the argument in terms of being compelled to forfeit a right. See, e.g., Welch v.
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York Court of Appeals characterized a refusal as testimonial evidence,
but it found that the defendant was not compelled to give that testimonial
evidence. 81 The court defined compulsion as physical compulsion or "a
penalty, punishment or detriment for the imposition of which no other
justification exists and of which the defendant is therefore entitled to be
free. "82 The only compulsion of which the Thomas court could conceive
was the compulsion to take the test.83 The court compared a motorist's
refusal to take a blood-alcohol test to a defendant's pretrial confession
of guilt made voluntarily, knowingly, and with the benefit of required
warnings;" this type of confession is admissible because it lacks compulsion. Finding no statutory or constitutional right to refuse to take the
test,85 the court held that introduction of evidence of the defendant's
refusal to take a blood-alcohol test did not violate the privilege against
self-incrimination because there is no compulsion to refuse to take the
test. 16
District Court, 594 F.2d 903 (2d Cir. 1979); State v. Jackson, 637 P.2d I (Mont. 1981). The McKay
court agreed with the state's contention that a refusal to take a breath-alcohol test is not compelled
but also approvingly cited Welch for the proposition that a motorist is not compelled to forfeit a
right. 99 N.M. at 31, 653 P.2d at 862.
80. 46 N.Y.2d 100, 385 N.E.2d 584, 412 N.Y.S.2d 845 (1978).
81. Id. at 108, 385 N.E.2d at 588, 412 N.Y.S.2d at 849. The defendant was involved in an
accident while driving his automobile. When the police arrived, they noticed that the defendant's
breath smelled of alcohol and that there was a half-empty wine bottle on the floor of the car. The
defendant was taken to the hospital where he was requested to submit to a blood-alcohol test; he
refused and was informed that his refusal could be introduced into evidence at trial. The defendant
persisted in his refusal and no test was administered. Evidence of the defendant's refusal was admitted
into evidence at his subsequent trial for DWI over his objection, and the defendant was found guilty
of a lesser-included offense of driving while impaired. Id. at 103-04, 385 N.E.2d at 585-86, 412
N.Y.S.2d at 846-47.
The Appellate Term of the New York Supreme Court, First Department, reversed the conviction
on the grounds that the introduction of evidence of the defendant's refusal violated his fifth amendment
privilege against self-incrimination. Id. at 104-05, 385 N.E.2d at 586, 412 N.Y.S.2d at 847. The
New York Court of Appeals, in reversing the supreme court, found a refusal to be testimonial but
not compelled. It based the finding that a refusal is testimonial on the relevance of the evidence; it
is relevant because it indicates fear of the test results (i.e., knowledge of guilt). According to the
court of appeals, a refusal, therefore, is testimonial in nature. Id. at 106-07, 385 N.E.2d at 58788, 412 N.Y.S.2d at 848-49. See also infra text accompanying notes 130-42 (relationship between
relevancy and conduct indicating a consciousness of guilt).
Note that New York, unlike New Mexico, requires a motorist to be informed that his refusal can
be used in court against him. N.Y. Veh. & Traf. Law § 1194, subd. 4 (McKinney Supp. 1982-83).
It is important that the motorist have that knowledge in order to make an informed choice whether
to take the test or not. See infra text accompanying notes 148-51.
82. 46 N.Y.2d at 106, 385 N.E.2d at 587, 412 N.Y.S.2d at 848.
83. Id. at 108, 385 N.E.2d at 588, 412 N.Y.S.2d at 849.
84. Id. aj 107, 385 N.E.2d at 587, 412 N.Y.S.2d at 849. The Thomas court identified a pretrial
confession as "perhaps the ultimate in self-incriminating matter." Id*
85. Id. at 109, 385 N.E.2d at 589, 412 N.Y.S.2d at 850. The defendant, therefore, could have
taken the test without forfeiting his rights. Id. at 108, 385 N.E.2d at 588, 412 N.Y.S.2d at 850.
86. Id. at 108, 385 N.E.2d at 588, 412 N.Y.S.2d at 849.
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2. The Minority View
The minority view holds that evidence of a motorist's refusal to take
a breath-alcohol test is not admissible because the admission would violate
the privilege against self-incrimination.8 7 The'minority finds that a refusal
is testimonial in nature and is compelled by the state. 88 Fundamental to
this determination is the characterization of the statutory ability to refuse
as a right.89 These courts refuse to accept the proposition that because
submission to a breath-alcohol test is non-testimonial, a refusal also is
non-testimonial. 9° In addition, these courts find that admitting a refusal
into evidence compels a defendant to make an unfair choice of providing
evidence of one kind or another.9'
Representative of this line of reasoning is State v. Jackson,92 in which
the Montana Supreme Court upheld a trial court's determination that a
statute which permitted evidence of a motorist's refusal to take a breathalcohol test violated the defendant's privilege against self-incrimination
guaranteed by the fifth amendment and the Montana Constitution.9 3 The
Jackson court found that a refusal is testimonial because it indicates
consciousness of guilt.94 The court perceptively predicted that prosecutors
will point out to the jury that the refusal is "circumstantial evidence of
the defendant's belief that the test results would have been incriminating."" In addition, the court stated that an accused is compelled either
87. See, e.g., People v. Rodriguez, 364 N.Y.S.2d 786 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1975); see also Annot.,
87 A.L.R.2d 370, 383 (1963) and supplementary cases.
88. See, e.g., People v. Rodriguez, 364 N.Y.S.2d 786 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1975)
89. See, e.g., State v. Jackson, 637 P.2d 1, 2 (Mont. 1981).
90. See, e.g., People v. Rodriguez, 364 N.Y.S.2d 786, 790 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1975). The Rodriguez
court termed such a conclusion a "non-sequitur" and asserted that a "[r]efusal is, by definition,
communication." Id.
91. See, e.g., State v. Jackson, 637 P.2d 1, 2 (Mont. 1981).
92. 637 P.2d I (Mont. 1981).
93. Jackson was arrested for DWI and refused to take a breath-alcohol test at the police station;
the police videotaped his refusal. The trial court granted the defendant's motion in limine to suppress
all evidence of the refusal to submit to the breath-alcohol test. Id. at 2.
The Montana statute, held to violate the fifth amendment and the state constitution, stated in
pertinent part:
(2) If the person under arrest refused to submit to the test as hereinabove provided,
proof of refusal shall be admissible in any action or proceeding arising out of
acts alleged to have been committed while the person was driving or in actual
physical control of a motor vehicle upon the public highways while under the
influence of intoxicating liquor.
Mont. Code Ann. § 61-8-404 (1981) (emphasis added).
The Montana Constitution provides, in pertinent part:
No person shall be compelled to testify against himself in a criminal proceeding.
Mont. Const. art. II, § 25.
94. 637 P.2d at 3.
95. Id. at 3. The court expressed concern that this evidence lacks reliability and, in effect, would
force the defendant to take the stand to exculpate himself or bear the consequences of inculpation
that his silence would engender. The court listed many innocent reasons for a defendant's refusal
to take the test (such as asthma, distrust of the procedure or the abilities of its administrators, fear
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to provide the physical evidence desired by submitting to the breathalcohol test or to provide testimonial evidence of his consciousness of
guilt by refusing to take the test.96 The court declared, "[t]hat [choice]
is no choice at all." 97 The court found that an accused's privilege against
self-incrimination would be violated because the state would force the
accused to chose to forfeit the statutory right to refuse the breath-alcohol
test or to have "a strong inference of guilt"98 demonstrated from the
assertion of the right to refuse. The Jackson court, therefore, deemed
that the evidence of a defendant's refusal to take a breath-alcohol test is
inadmissible because the defendant is compelled to provide testimonial
evidence against himself."
3. McKay v. Davis
In McKay, the New Mexico Supreme Court endorsed the majority view
that refusal evidence is admissible. Additionally, the court accepted both
rationales underlying the majority view, finding that a motorist's "refusal
to take the [breath-alcohol] test is neither compelled nor testimonial communication of the type protected by the fifth amendment.""° Adopting
the finding expressed in Newhouse v. Misterly'°' that a refusal is best
characterized as "conduct indicating a consciousness of guilt,"'0 2 the
supreme court concluded that a refusal is physical rather than testimonial
evidence. 10 3 The McKay court stated that" [McKay's] act of refusal merely
exposes him to the drawing of inferences,

act. "'04

...

just as does any other

The court also embraced the view that the state does not compel the
refusal.'0 5 The court looked to Welch v. District Court of Vermont Unit
No. 5, Washington County"° in reaching this conclusion. Welch held that
of incurring the cost of the test, doubts as to the reliability of the test, and the desire to have a
doctor present) and found that the introduction of refusal evidence would be highly prejudicial in
such circumstances. This is especially true when an accused cannot personally testify to his innocent
motivations for refusing because he declines to take the stand for other reasons. See Comment,
ConstitutionalLimitations on the Taking of Body Evidence, 78 Yale L.J. 1074, 1083 (1969).

96. 637 P.2d at 2.
97. Id.
98. Id.at 4.
99. Id.at 1.
100. 99 N.M. at 31, 653 P.2d at 862.
101. 415 F.2d 514 (9th Cir. 1969).
102. 99 N.M. at 31, 653 P.2d at 862 (quoting Newhouse v. Misterly, 415 F.2d 514, 518 (9th
Cir. 1969)).
103. 99 N.M. at 31, 653 P.2d at 862. The McKay court conceded, however, that it was difficult
to draw the line between physical and testimonial evidence in the case before it. Id.
104. Id. (citing People v. Ellis, 65 Cal. 2d 529, 421 P.2d 393, 55 Cal. Rptr. 385 (1966)).
105. McKay, 99 N.M. at 31, 653 P.2d at 862. See also supra note 79 (discussing the confusion
that exists as to what is being compelled).
106. 594 F.2d 903 (2d Cir. 1979). The defendant was convicted of DWI after evidence of his
refusal to take a breath-alcohol test was admitted into evidence at trial. The Second Circuit denied
the defendant's petition for a writ of habeas corpus.
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the refusal was admissible because Vermont did not compel a driver
refusing to take a breath-alcohol test to surrender any constitutional right."o7
Finding no New Mexico statutory right of refusal and no constitutional
right of refusal, the McKay court also embraced the view that the admission of evidence of a motorist's refusal fails to impinge upon the fifth
amendment privilege against self-incrimination because the refusal lacks
compulsion. 10 8
The resolution of the fifth amendment question in McKay was premised
on the separate findings that a motorist's refusal to take a breath-alcohol
test is not compelled and is non-testimonial. Either of these determinations
by itself would have been sufficient to dispose of the question. The court's
decision is overly broad. The court could have ended its inquiry upon a
finding that a refusal to take a breath-alcohol test is not compelled and
could have omitted the discussion of whether the refusal is non-testimonial. "0
4. South Dakota v. Neville
Subsequent to the New Mexico Supreme Court decision in McKay, the
United States Supreme Court decided the fifth amendment implications
of a motorist's refusal to take a breath-alcohol test. In South Dakota v.
Neville, "' the United States Supreme Court reversed the South Dakota
Supreme Court which, even though South Dakota law permitted the
admission of refusal evidence, had affirmed the suppression of all evidence of the defendant's refusal to take a breath-alcohol test. "' The South
Dakota Supreme Court had held that the introduction of refusal evidence
would violate the privilege against self-incrimination, granted by the
United States and South Dakota Constitutions, on the grounds that the
107. Id. at 905. The relevant Vermont statute stated: "If the person refuses to submit to a chemical
test, it shall not be given but such a refusal may be introduced into evidence at a criminal proceeding."
Vt. Stat. Ann. tit. 23, § 1205(a) (1978) (current version at Vt. Stat. Ann. tit. 23, § 1205(a) (Cum.
Supp. 1983)). New Mexico does not include a similar provision in its Implied Consent Act.
108. 99 N.M. at 31, 653 P.2d at 862.
109. See infra text accompanying notes 125-29.
110. 103 S. Ct. 916 (1983).
111. The case involved a motorist, Mason Henry Neville, who after consuming approximately a
case of beer by himself at home, was stopped by police officers after he failed to stop at a stop sign;
he smelled of alcohol and staggered upon leaving his vehicle. Neville was unable to produce a
driver's license as it had been revoked following a previous DWI conviction. The officers arrested
Neville after he failed to perform satisfactorily two field sobriety tests. The police requested that
Neville take a breath-alcohol test and informed him that a refusal to submit could lead to a revocation
of his driver's license. Neville refused to take the test and declared: "I'm too drunk, I won't pass
the test." He refused additional requests to take the test for the same reason. Id. at 918-19.
The Neville case reached the United States Supreme Court after the South Dakota Supreme Court
affirmed a lower court's suppression of evidence of Neville's refusal. The South Dakota Supreme
Court held that a provision of the South Dakota statutes that permitted admission of refusal evidence,
S.D. Comp. Laws Ann. § 32-23-10.1 (Supp. 1982), was unconstitutional because it violated the
defendant's privilege against self-incrimination. State v. Neville, 312 N.W.2d 723, 725 (S.D. 1981).
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refusal was a testimonial act compelled by the state." 2 The United States
Supreme Court determined that the admission into evidence of a motorist'srefusal to submit to a breath-alcohol test does not violate the fifth amendment privilege against self-incrimination.' 13 Additionally, the Court held
that due process does not require states to warn motorists that a refusal
4 The United States Supreme Court
can be used against them in court. ",
and the New Mexico Supreme Court reached the same conclusion regarding the fifth amendment implications of a motorist's refusal to take
a breath-alcohol test; the United States Supreme Court, however, reached
its conclusion on much narrower grounds.
The Court found the argument that a refusal is physical evidence, not
testimonial evidence, to have "considerable force,"" 5 but also recognized
that the case before the Court was one in which the distinction was not
easily drawn." 6 The Court declined to rest its decision on the distinction
between physical and testimonial evidence, however, because it found
that the motorist was not compelled by the state to refuse to take the
test.' The Court reserved the issue of the delineation between physical
and testimonial evidence." 8 The Court noted that the fifth amendment
prevents any person from being "compelled in any criminal case to be a
witness against himself."' 9 The Court held that a state does not compel
a motorist to refuse to take a blood-alcohol test because the motorist has
20
the choice of taking the test or refusing to take the test. The Court held
that a refusal, because it is not compelled, is not the type of evidence
2
protected by the fifth amendment privilege against self-incrimination.' '
evidence of a refusal to take a blood-alcohol test is admissiTherefore,
22
'
ble.
112. State v. Neville, 312 N.W.2d 723 (S.D. 1981).
113. 103 S.Ct. at 920-23. Justice Stevens, joined by Justice Marshall, dissented on the grounds
that the South Dakota Supreme Court had found that the admission of refusal evidence violated the
South Dakota privilege against self-incrimination. Justice Stevens argued that the United States
Supreme Court was powerless to overturn the South Dakota Supreme Court decision because it
rested on independent state grounds. Id. at 924-26.
114. Id. at 923-24.
115. Id.at 921-22.
116. Id.at922.
which
117. Id.The Court was mindful of its previous decisions in which it found thattests
seemingly sought physical evidence, such as lie detector tests and court-ordered psychiatric examinations, could not be compelled because of the fifth amendment privilege against self-incrimination.
Id.at922 n.12.
118. Id.at 922.
119. Id. (quoting U.S. Const. amend. V) (emphasis in original).
exists as towhat isbeing compelled).
120. Id. But see supranote 79 (discussing the confusion that
Actually, according to the Court, a state would prefer that the accused take the test because the
physical evidence that results from compliance is much more probative than the inferences that can
be drawn from a refusal. Id. at 923.
121. Id.at 923.
122. Id.at918.

NEW MEXICO LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 14

The United States Supreme Court in South Dakota v. Neville reinforced
the New Mexico Supreme Court's determination in McKay v. Davis that
the fifth amendment does not prevent the admission of evidence of a
motorist's refusal to take a breath-alcohol test. The United States Supreme
Court proceeded more cautiously than the New Mexico Supreme Court
in deciding the issue of whether the admission of evidence of a motorist's
refusal to take a blood-alcohol test violates the accused's privilege against
self-incrimination. The United States Supreme Court recognized that, in
our scientifically-advanced society, the distinction between physical and
testimonial evidence sometimes can be murky. 123 Devices such as polygraphs, which simply register physiological responses, may appear to
gather physical evidence, but their value lies solely in the testimonial
communications gleaned from those physiological responses. The United
States Supreme Court declined to determine whether a refusal to take a
chemical test is testimonial in nature or whether it constitutes physical
evidence. 124
The New Mexico Supreme Court exerted no such self-restraint in McKay.
The New Mexico court broadly stated its decision in terms of a refusal
to take a "chemical test," rather than the more narrow and specific "bloodalcohol test," and made the unnecessary determination that a refusal is
not testimonial evidence.125 Once a court finds, as did the McKay court,
that no statutory or constitutional right to refuse to take the test exists, 126
the accused faces no compulsion to refuse to take the test. The privilege
against self-incrimination is not implicated. The court, therefore, was not
required to determine that a refusal is non-testimonial. It can be argued
that "[clonduct indicating a consciousness of guilt' ' 27 is testimonial in
nature. 28 Regardless of the ultimate resolution of that debate, it is a
question that did not need to be addressed in McKay.
McKay constitutes a solid New Mexico precedent that the refusal to
submit to a chemical test for which no right of refusal exists is admissible
into evidence over fifth amendment objections. Based on the unnecessary
discussion on the testimonial nature of refusal evidence, the McKay decision suggests that no refusal, compelled or non-compelled, to take a
chemical test will ever be protected by the fifth amendment privilege
123. Id. at 922 n.12.
124. Id. at 922.
125. 99 N.M. at 31, 653 P.2d at 862.
126. Id.
127. Id. (quoting Newhouse v. Misterly, 415 F.2d 514,
128. See State v. Esperti, 220 So. 2d 416 (Fla. Dist.
chemical test for the presence of powder burns to determine
a gun was testimonial in nature but admissible because the
refusal was not compelled).

518 (9th Cir. 1969)).
Ct. App. 1969) (refusal to submit to a
whether the defendant recently had fired
defendant had no right to refuse and the
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against self-incrimination.' 29 In order to invoke fifth amendment protection, one must show that the chemical test to which one refused to submit
is used to draw inferences about a person's state of mind to the degree
that it amounts to more than mere chemical or physical testing.
C. The Relevance of Refusal

New Mexico Rule of Evidence 401 states that "'[relevant evidence'
means evidence having any tendency to make the existence of any fact
that is of consequence to the determination of the action more probable
or less probable than it would be without the evidence." 3 ' In essence,
3
relevant evidence is that which tends to establish a material proposition.'
In McKay v. Davis, the New Mexico Supreme Court held that a refusal
to take a chemical test is relevant and admissible to show a defendant's
32
consciousness of guilt and fear of the test results.' The court allowed
the state to introduce evidence of McKay's refusal to take a breath-alcohol
test to show McKay's consciousness of guilt and fear of the test results
33
and to establish that McKay was under the influence of alcohol.'
The New Mexico Supreme Court in McKay rejected the district court's
assertion that State v. Chavez 3 4 established that evidence of a refusal to
35
take a chemical test is irrelevant as a matter of law.' In Chavez, the
New Mexico Court of Appeals upheld the exclusion of evidence of the
defendant's refusal to submit to a blood-alcohol test after his arrest for
DWI. The court found the defendant's refusal to take the test was no
more probative of his guilt than the policeman's failure to obtain a warrant
"Conduct indicating a consciousness of guilt" seems to indicate that proof of this conduct would
be used by the state to demonstrate, by the defendant's actions, that the defendant concedes that he
is guilty. It would seem, therefore, to be testimonial evidence. Indeed, when a person refuses to
take a breath-alcohol test, the inference is that he is stating: "I refuse to take this test because it
will prove what I already know-I am guilty." See Comment, Constitutional Limitations on the
Taking of Body Evidence, 78 Yale L.J. 1074, 1082-85 (1969). If "conduct indicating a consciousness
of guilt" is not testimonial in nature, no conduct can ever be testimonial. It is hard to imagine any
conduct which would fall under fifth amendment protection when the McKay standard is applied.
129. This result is worrisome. It is not too far-fetched to imagine that a person who refuses to
submit to a compulsory polygraph examination could have that refusal used as evidence against him.
Such an examination is similar to chemical testing because it objectively measures physical responses.
A polygraph's sole use is to draw inferences about a person's veracity or state of mind from that
data. People should be able to refuse to submit to polygraph examinations without fear of being
penalized because one should not be forced to disclose the workings of his mind.
130. N.M. R. Evid. 401. This language is identical to the language used in Rule 401 of the
Federal Rules of Evidence.
131. State v. Thurman, 84 N.M. 5, 7, 498 P.2d 697, 699 (Ct. App. 1972).
132. 99 N.M. at 32, 653 P.2d at 863.
133. Id.
134. 96 N.M. 313,629 P.2d 1242 (Ct. App.), cert. denied, 96 N.M. 543,632 P.2d 1181 (1981).
135. 99 N.M. at 32, 653 P.2d at 863.
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to perform the test was probative of the defendant's innocence.136 In
addition, the Chavez court stated that there might be innocent reasons
for refusing to take a test, such as religious beliefs, unwillingness to incur
expense, and distrust of the technicians or the results, which would make
admission of refusal evidence misleading. 3 7 As a result, the court of
appeals held that evidence of Chavez' refusal to take a blood-alcohol test
was inadmissible because "I[i]t was simply not relevant evidence."' 38 The
New Mexico Supreme Court in McKay, while not explicitly overruling
Chavez, found that, absent special circumstances, a refusal would be
relevant.

'9

The McKay court determined that a jury reasonably could infer that
consciousness of guilt and fear of the results motivated a motorist to
refuse to take the test and, therefore, evidence of a defendant's refusal
to take a breath-alcohol test is relevant and admissible. "0 The court held
open the possibility that, in a given case, a trial court could rule evidence
of a refusal to take a chemical test irrelevant. "' Factors such as respiratory
ailments, religious objections, or extreme technophobia might lead an
accused motorist to refuse to take a breath-alcohol test. A trial court could
hold that such factors make the defendant's refusal irrelevant to any
136. Chavez, 96 N.M. 313, 314, 629 P.2d 1242, 1243. This analogy lacks persuasiveness because
the statute relied upon by the Chavez court provides that if a motorist refuses to take the test, none
shall be administered. N.M. Stat. Ann. § 66-8-111(A) (Cum. Supp. 1983). A search warrant to
administer the test may be procured, however, if the motorist is believed to have been driving under
the influence of alcohol or drugs and thereby caused the death or likelihood of death of another
person or allegedly committed a felony while under the influence. Chavez was charged only with
DWI and, therefore, the officer had no right to obtain a search warrant to compel Chavez to submit
to a blood-alcohol test. Had the officer obtained the warrant and compelled the defendant to submit
to the blood-alcohol test, the results would have been inadmissible. See State v. Steele, 93 N.M.
470, 601 P.2d 440 (Ct. App. 1979) (a vehicular homicide case decided under former law); State v.
Wilson, 92 N.M. 54, 582 P.2d 826 (Ct. App. 1978). The officer in Chavez had no right to obtain
a search warrant. Conclusions based upon the failure of a police officer to obtain a search warrant
are unjustified.
137. 96 N.M. at 314, 629 P.2d at 1243.
138. Id.
139. 99 N.M. at 32, 653 P.2d at 863.
140. Id. The court noted several cases which held that flight, aborted flight, or escape from
incarceration (State v. Trujillo, 95 N.M. 535, 541-42, 624 P.2d 44, 50-51 (1981)), resisting or
avoiding arrest (State v. Nelson, 65 N.M. 403, 412, 338 P.2d 301, 307, cert. denied, 361 U.S. 877
(1959)), and tampering with a witness (State v. Gonzales, 93 N.M. 445, 601 P.2d 78 (Ct. App.
1979)) are relevant to show consciousness of guilt. These cases, however, deal with conduct that is
unlawful per se, unlike a refusal to submit to a breath-alcohol test. In State v. Esperti, 220 So. 2d
416 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1969), a case also cited in McKay, the court analogized the refusal to take
a chemical test to the actions of an accused in resisting and avoiding a lawful arrest and escaping
or fleeing from lawful custody. The Florida court held that a refusal to take a test for the presence
of powder bums, which would indicate whether the defendant recently had fired a gun, was admissible
to show consciousness of guilt. Id. at 418. Espertiinvolved the refusal to take a chemical test which
was admissible and compulsory, unlike the non-compulsory breath-alcohol test involved in McKay.
The court stated that evidence of a refusal to take a non-compulsory breath-alcohol test would be
inadmissible. Id. at 419.
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consciousness of guilt and render the evidence inadmissible. Alternatively,
the trial court could admit refusal evidence and instruct the jury to weigh
it along with the defendant's explanation for his refusal in order to dethe
termine whether the refusal indicated a consciousness
42 of guilt or was
part.1
defendant's
the
on
result of a valid objection
The determination of the relevancy of refusal evidence flows from the
court's resolution of the fifth amendment question. The court found that
a refusal to take a breath-alcohol test is not testimonial but it is "conduct
indicating a consciousness of guilt"; 143 the evidence is admissible because
evidence of one's consciousness of guilt is relevant. Had the court not
invoked the physical/testimonial distinction as a basis for the resolution
of the fifth amendment question, the determination of the relevancy question would not have been so obvious. The court might have been forced
to hold that evidence of a motorist's refusal to take a breath-alcohol test
could not be introduced as evidence of the defendant's guilt or innocence,
but could be employed only to explain to the jury why the state could
offer no scientific evidence of intoxication.'44 A limited use of refusal
evidence may not be undesireable, however, because it would eliminate
the necessity of forcing a defendant to take the stand to explain the reasons
for his refusal. This limited use also would resolve the apprehension
expressed by the McKay court that suppression of the evidence would
the mistaken impression that no breath-alcohol test was ofengender
145
fered.
IV. CONCLUSION
In McKay v. Davis, the New Mexico Supreme Court found no basis
on statutory, constitutional, or relevancy grounds to hold as inadmissible
evidence of a motorist's refusal to take a breath-alcohol test when arrested
for DWI or a related offense.146 The court's conclusion that refusal evidence is admissible is justified on public policy grounds. The court noted
that a contrary holding would hamper the purposes of the Implied Consent
Act of deterring DWI and discovering drunk drivers and removing them
141. 99 N.M. at 32, 653 P.2d at 863.
142. See State v. Jackson, 637 P.2d 1, 6 (Mont. 1981) (Haswell, C.J., dissenting); Hill v. State,
366 So. 2d 318 (Ala. 1979).
143. 99 N.M. at 31, 653 P.2d at 862 (quoting from Newhouse v. Misterly, 415 F.2d 514, 518
(9th Cir. 1969)).
144. In Welch v. District Court, 594 E2d 903 (2d Cir. 1979), the trial court, upon the state's
request, imposed such a restriction on the use of refusal evidence.
145. 99 N.M. at 30, 653 P.2d at 861. Juries might still infer that the refusal was the result of
consciousness of guilt but the effect of this inference would be lessened by an instruction limiting
the relevancy of refusal evidence. The state would be forced not to build its case around a motorist's
refusal to take the test.
146. Id. at 32, 653 P.2d at 863.
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from the highways; 147 the state then would have greater difficulty obtaining
a DWI conviction of a person who refused to take a breath-alcohol test.
That result would defeat the intent of the Legislature when it prohibited
forced testing.
The state desires compliance with the requirements of the Implied
Consent Act. In addition to being informed that a refusal to submit to a
breath-alcohol test may result in license revocation, a motorist who is
requested to take a breath-alcohol test should be informed that the refusal
may be used against him at trial. 4' 8 The United States Supreme Court has
determined that due process does not require such a warning, 4' 9 but there
is authority in New Mexico which indicates that due process requires the
police to inform an accused of the consequences of refusal. 5 ° The additional knowledge that a refusal will be admitted into evidence against
a person may encourage a recalcitrant motorist to submit to the test. In
order to fulfill the purposes of the Implied Consent Act of determining
the blood-alcohol level of a motorist accused of DWI, the Legislature
should incorporate a warning provision into the New Mexico statutes to
discourage motorists from refusing to take a blood-alcohol or breathalcohol test. '5'
SEAN DEVLIN BERSELL
147. Id. at 30, 653 P.2d at 861.
148. South Dakota began informing motorists of the admissibility of evidence of a refusal to take
a breath-alcohol test subsequent to the incident involved in South Dakota v. Neville, 103 S. Ct.
916, 924 n.17 (1983).
149. Id. at 923-24. See also State v. Myers, 88 N.M. 16, 21, 536 P.2d 280, 285 (Ct. App. 1975)
(a motorist has no constitutional right to be given a warning regarding the consequences of refusing
to submit to a blood test).
150. In re McCain, 84 N.M. 657, 506 P.2d 1204 (1973). In McCain, the New Mexico Supreme
Court reversed a district court's recision of an order of the Commissioner of Motor Vehicles revoking
McCain's driver's license for her refusal to take a blood-alcohol test. The court held, in part, that
because the New Mexico Implied Consent Act provides that a motorist be informed of the consequences of a refusal to take a blood-alcohol test, it does not violate the due process clause of either
the state or federal constitutions. Id. at 661, 506 P.2d at 1208. The case specifically dealt with the
revocation of a driver's license and not with the admissibility of a refusal; this holding, however,
is broad enough to warrant its expansion to mandate that due process requires a motorist to be
informed that a refusal can be used in evidence against him. There is dicta to the contrary in State
v. Myers, 88 N.M. 16, 536 P.2d 280 (Ct. App. 1975). In Myers, the court held that there was "no
overriding constitutional requirement" that an accused be forewarned of the consequences of refusing
to take a blood-alcohol test. Id. at 21, 536 P.2d at 285.
151. N.M. Stat. Ann. § 66-8-111 (Cum. Supp. 1983) could be amended to read:
C. A person under arrest for violation of an offense enumerated in the Motor
Vehicle Code who is requested by a law enforcement officer to submit to a
chemical test designated by the law enforcement agency as provided in Section
66-8-107 NMSA 1978 shall be informed that a refusal to submit to the designated chemical test could result in the revocation of his privilege to drive
and may be used in evidence against him at trial.

